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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case No.
8205

vs.
C. JEAN SHONKA,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was convicted of Grand Larceny. The charge
was, in substance, that she stole a check belonging to Box
Elder High School at Brigham City, Utah, cashed the check,
and kept the money.
Counsel for appellant states his version of the facts
and after a brief resume of the activities of the defendant,
Miss C. Jean Shonka, as to her handling of a certain check
in the amount of $300.55, declares "upon all of this there
is no dispute * * * " Respondent reads the record
otherwise.
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Miss Shonka was an employee of the Board of Education of Box Elder County from September, 1945, until
December 23, 1952, upon which later date she, by request,
resigned. Miss Shonka had been employed as a secretary
and office employee of the Box Elder High School and as
her years of employment passed, certain other duties were
assigned to her which eventually included that of handling
the funds of the school, keeping the books, making deposits
and joining with the high school principal as a co-signer of
checks drawn on school funds.
For reasons not fully disclosed by the record, Miss
Shonka was relieved of the responsibility of receipting for
and depositing school funds on or about January 2, 1952
(R. 211), and she had been theretofore relieved of her responsibility for opening the school mail (R. 35-36). The
principal of the school, Mr. Freeman, assumed the responsibility for opening the mail and a Mr. Austin Larson, member of the faculty, assumed the obligation of receipting for,
handling and banking the school funds (R. 35). It would
appear that, subsequent to the date of these changes, the
extent of Miss Shonka's authority to handle funds was
limited to a so-called "petty cash" fund in the amount of
$25.00 which, when depleted, would be reimbursed by means
of a check drawn against the school funds, signed by Miss
Shonka and countersigned by Mr. Freeman.
In preparing for the registration of students to be
conducted on the 25th, 26th and 27th of August, 1952, Miss
Shonka performed certain duties for the accomplishment
thereof. She states that knowing money would be necessary for registering the students, she went to the file draw-
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ers in the vault room to obtain change for that purpose (R.
212) but, as says appellant's counsel, "the cupboard was
bare." However, it was in fact only bare of silver and currency, for lVIiss Shonka says she therein found a check (R.
212). This check represented a reimbursement to the Box
Elder High School for funds they had expended in their
participation in the State High School Basketball Tournament of 1952 and the check bore the date of March 28, 1952.
Miss Shonka had been, as heretofore related, relieved of
her responsibility to handle the funds of the school as of
January 2, 1952, but she nevertheless found it expeditious
to take this said check in the amount of $300.55 to the bank
on the 21st day of August, 1952, and there cash it. Having
admittedly done so, Miss Shonka informed the court and
jury that she placed the funds received, ten $20 bills, four
$10 bills, ten $5 bills, together with $10.55 in silver, in a
bag which she had taken with her to the bank (R. 213),
and that she then returned to the high school and placed
the bag in the third drawer of a steel filing cabinet where
it was left until a Monday morning, August 25th (R. 214).
On that Monday morning, according to Miss Shonka, she
removed from the bag two $10 bills, four $5 bills and $10
in silver (R. 215) for the purpose of making up a "change
box" for the registration activities (R. 214). Thereafter,
apparently on the morning of the third day of registration,
Miss Shonka contends that she took $50 from the "change
box", of which she put $20 back in the money bag in the
vault and put the remaining $30 into another cash box for
registration purposes on that day (R. 222). Then on the
morning of August 28th, Miss Shonka says, she took $30
from the second change box which she deposited back in
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the money bag which was still in the third drawer in the
filing case in the vault (R. 224). Thereafter, she never saw
it again (R. 226).
Miss Shonka says, as to her further conduct, that she
never mentioned her finding of this $300.55 check to anyone (R. 268) ; that she knew it was from the Utah High
School Activities Association (R. 273) ; that she knew Mr.
Larson was supposed to receipt for it (R. 274) ; that she
knew she should have had a receipt for it (R. 274); that
she knew it was Mr. Larson's duty to deposit it in the bank
(R. 274) ; that she knew she had not entered it upon the
school books (R. 274); that she knew the school books
would not balance if she did not make the entry (R. 274,
275); that she had never prior to this hearing ever mentioned to any school official that she had cashed the check
for change for registration or any other purpose (R. 275).
Miss Shonka further stated that there was no record of an
entry or notation concerning the item of $300.55 in any
of her books or records ( R. 279) . From the 28th day of
August, 1952, until the time of the termination of her employment, December 23, 1952, Miss Shonka claimed no concern for this sizeable amount of money. This irrespective
of the fact that on prior occasions her desk had been pilfered (R. 267, 269) and the police had been called in (R.
268) . The record further shows that Miss Shonka had been
called upon for a personal accounting in the forepart of
October, 1952 (R. 263) ; that she did not reply to such a
request (R. 264) ; and that she was given an ultimatum
that she, account by December 19 or be dismissed (R. 278);
nor did she meet the terms of this ultimatum but, "* * *
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I dropped the matter because I figured I was complying
with one or the other of their requests by resigning."

From the testimony of Miss Shonka alone, the jury
could only find that her accounts and books were not in
order and that she declined to account therefore.
Thus, even though the jury had accepted as true the
full testimony of Miss Shonka, they could not help but
entertain a reasonable doubt as to her culpability.
There was further evidence adduced not consistent
with Miss Shonka's testimony. Norman Jeppsen, a teacher
at Box Elder High School, testified that he received no
funds from Miss Shonka for the purpose of making change
(R. 324) ; so testified Delmont Beecher, also a teacher (R.
354) ; nor did Helen Smith Pierce recall that when she
commenced her duty registering students, she received any
change (R. 368) ; Norwood Hyer, also a teacher, registered
students and was furnished no change for such purpose
(R. 370) ; nor was L. D. Wilde furnished any moneys for
the purpose of making change (R. 381). These are the
employees of the Box Elder High· School who conducted the
registration of the students of that school on the 25th, 26th
and 27th of August, 1952. They say not what Miss Shonka
says.
Too, there was testimony to the effect that a certified
public accountant, doing an independent audit, was unable
to find any trace of the check or the proceeds of the check
to the school's credit (R. 164-165). And, also, the school's
treasurer, Mr. Larson, to whom had been delegated the
function of receiving all moneys which came into the school,
never received either the check or the proceeds (R. 119).
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We deem the facts sufficient to sustain the verdict. It
was the judgment and sentence of the court that the defendant be incarcerated in the State Prison for not less
than one nor more than ten years.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE CASE PRESENTED AND THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE SUSTAINS THE CHARGE OF GRAND LARCENY
AND THE CAUSE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
POINT II
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 8 WAS
WITHOUT ERROR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CASE PRESENTED AND THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE SU~
T'AINS THE CHARGE OF GRAND LARCENY
AND THE CAUSE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying,
leading or driving away the personal property of another.
Section 76-38-1, U. C. A. 1953.
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Appellant's contention here is, as we construe the brief
of appellant on this Point I, that the evidence presented in
this cause was insufficient to show a felonious taking as a
matter of law and therefore not a question of fact for the
jury.
Appellant claims:
"Upon the evidence of the state, without considering that of the defendant, herself, we contended
and do contend that there were not sufficient facts
or inference from facts to warrant a finding that
the defendant had a felonious intent in cashing the
check, or that she had a felonious intent in carrying the money out of the bank. * * *"
"The check was, in full day light, cashed on
August 21, 1952. * * *"
"There was not the slightest element of concealment by the defendant. * * *"
"It has been held by this Honorable Court in
several cases and throughout the time of the Court,
that it is the duty of the judge, upon a trial for
grand larceny to take the case from the jury when
the evidence is insufficient to show a felonious taking."
The State concedes and this Court has held, People v.
Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 P. 514; State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37,
189 P. 84; that there must be an intent to steal at the time
of the taking and that intent is a necessary element of the
crime of larceny. However,

"* * * intent is not always disclosed by what
one says, but also is determined by what one says
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and does, or fails to say or do in [a] given situation,
together with other facts and circumstances surrounding [the] transaction."

Loper v. U. S., 160 Fed. 2d 293.
So, Miss Shonka's having gone openly to the bank to
exchange the check for cash is not sufficient to disprove
a felonious intent in the face of her further unsatisfactory
explanation of the disposition of the funds she thus obtained.
As the State reads appellant's authorities: State v.
Nelson, 39 Utah 238, 117 P. 71; State v. Morrell, 39 Utah
498, 118 P. 215; State v. Allen, supra; Akins v. State, 12
Okla. Cr. 269, 154 P. 1007; State v. Morris, 70 Utah 570,
262 P. 107; all of these cases concern themselves with the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and to
prove a felonious taking. Despite the syllabus to which appellant refers in the case of State v. Morris, supra, this is
the question in that case that the court ask of itse1f, "Was
the evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction?"
(70 Utah at 576.) There can be no doubt that the rule announced in the cases referred to is correct as applied to the
facts of those cases. These cases are not, however, authority for the proposition "that it is the duty of the judge, upon
a trial for grand larceny, to take the case from the jury
when the evidence is insufficient to show a felonious taking," for which appellant contends. We would be the first
to concede that in the absence of any question of fact, there
would be no function for the jury to perform. Such is not
here the case.
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Appellant further contends, that:
"By the verdict of not guilty of embezzlement,
the jury determined, and so said, that they were not
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant converted the money, $300.55 received by her
upon the check, to her own use; and furthermore,
the jury were not satisfied, and so said by their
verdict, that she had a felonious intent to appropriate it to her own use, and to deprive the owner of it."
.Such a contention will not bear investigation for the very
reason that there is a distinction, which we thing appellant
over looks, between possession and custody of property ;
which makes for a distinction between "larceny" and "embezzlement".
"Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation
of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted.''
Section 76-17-1, U. C. A. 1953.
On and after January 2, 1952, Miss Shonka ceased to act
in a fiduciary capacity as recipient of funds for the school.
When she, on the 21st day of August, 1952, took, endorsed
and cashed the check, she took into her possession funds
that had not been intrusted to her. We suggest that the
jury found her not guilty of embezzlement because of the
fact that she did not come into possession of the check
under any color of right to possession thereof whatsoever
and that she could not have "fraudulently appropriated"
as a person to whom it had been intrusted. This finding
was not a bar to the further finding that she took something that did not belong to her; that her act in taking the
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check was larcenous so that she was guilty of feloniously
"stealing" from her employer. For a general treatment of
the distinction between possession and custody of property
consult 32 Am. Jur. 958, Larceny, Section 56, wherein it
is said:
"The rule was laid down that where one having only
the bare charge or custody of property for the owner
converts it animo furandi, he commits a trespass
and is guilty of larceny, the possession, in judgment
of law, remaining in the owner until the conversion.
This is the rule at common law and under statutes
declaratory of the common law."
It was said in Commonwealth v. Hays, (1859) 14 Gray
(Mass.) 62, 74 Am. Dec. 662 :
"The statutes relating to embezzlement, both in this
country and in England, had their origin in a design to supply a defect which was found to exist in
the criminal law. By reason of nice and subtle distinctions, which the courts of law had recognized
and sanctioned, it was difficult to reach and punish
the fraudulent taking and appropriation of money
and chattels by persons exercising certain trades
and occupations, by virtue of which they held a relation of confidence or trust towards their employers or principals, and thereby became possessed of
their property. In such cases the moral guilt was
the same as if the offender had been guilty of an
actual felonious taking; but in many cases he could
not be convicted of larceny, because the property
which had been fraudulently converted was lawfully
in his possession by virtue of his employment, and
there was not that technical taking or asportation
which is essential to the proof of the crime of larceny. . . . The statutes relating to embezzlement
W'ere intended to embrace this class of offenses and
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it may be said generally that they do not apply to
cases where the element of a breach of trust or confidence in the fraudulent conv·ersion of money or
chattels is not shown to exist." (Emphasis added.)
The jury correctly ruled out embezzlement and just as correctly decided by its verdict that larceny had been committed.
For a comprehensive annotation on the distinction between larceny and embezzlement, see 146 A. L. R. 532 and
the authorities there cited.
Miss .Shonka was not guilty of a ..breach of trust, for
she had no trust imposed upon her at the time of the taking; but, Miss Shonka was guilty of the theft of the check
and the jury did and well could find that at the time of the
taking there was a felonious intent.

POINT II
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 8 WAS
WITHOUT ERROR.
The court instructed the jury :
"Every person who finds lost property under circumstances which give him knowledge of a means of
inquiry as to the true owner, and who appropriates
such property to his own use * * *, without
first making reasonable and just efforts to find the
owner and restore the property to him, is guilty of
larceny."
These are, along with the deletion, the words of the statute,
Section 76-38-2, U. C. A. 1953.
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Appellant claims for objection to this instruction that:

"* * * The entire account and all of the e·vidence
as to where the check was and where the money
went comes from the mouth of the defendant.
"This testimony is undisputed. The check was
found in a filing cabinet of the high school, cashed
by the bank, and the money, and all of it, placed and
left by the hand of the defendant where the check
was, namely, in the possession of the true owner, as
she, probably as. well as anyone, knew."
The jury was at liberty to believe or disbelieve that which
"comes from the mouth of the defenda:q.t ;" and they were
so instructed. (Instruction No. 15.) The court also instructed the jury :

"* * * If an instruction applies only to a state
of facts which you find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction. * * *" (Instruction No.
17.)
Instruction No. 8 does not stand alone, unexplained and
unqualified. The jury r~ay have believed Miss Shonka
when she said she found the check on the "west side of the
third drawer of the steel file in the vault room." If so, Miss
Shonka was a finder of lost property, and the instruction
was proper. If not, and the jury found such not to be the
fact, then they would disregard the instruction as the court
informed them to do by that part of Instruction No. 17 set
forth above.
It could be no more than mere conjecture to say that
this jury did not find the defendant guilty of larceny under
Instruction No. 7, wherein the elements necessary to con-
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stitute the offense of larceny were fully explained to them.
The jury viewed the witness, Shonka, and they may well
have believed nothing that came from the mouth of the defendant.
What has been said by both appellant and respondent
on this Point II is merely argumentive; however, unless
it is clear that the jury misunderstood the law or entirely
ignored evidence upon a material issue, its unanimous verdict, constitutionally required in criminal cases (Art. I,
Sec. 10, Constitution of Utah), is not to be set aside or interfered with for trivial or insufficient reasons. Instruction No. 8, as given, was applicable to the facts for which
defendant contended.
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CONCLUSION
The jury found C. Jean Shonka guilty of larceny as
charged. Appellant makes much of the fact that the check
stolen by Miss Shonka was taken openly to the bank where
it was cashed. We suggest that an attempt to cash the
check at any other place or under any other circumstances
would have been difficult if not impossible; that the check
was negotiated in a manner calculated to arouse the least
suspicion; that C. Jean Shonka intended to have· the money
for herself, otherwise she would not have concealed from
her employers (a) that she had the check in her possession,
(b) that she obtained cash for the check, and (c) what
became of the money.
The verdict should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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